Metrica Partners Pte. Ltd. ("Metrica"), a shareholder of WUS Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. (TWSE: 2316) ("WUS" or the "Company") holding approximately 1.5% of its issued shares, today published an open letter to the Company's Board of Directors. Metrica is releasing the letter publicly, on its website at http://metricapartners.com, while simultaneously delivering it to the directors of WUS by email and in hard copy.
Metrica is taking this step only after repeated attempts over several weeks to engage privately through the Company's published investor-contact window — by both email and telephone — went entirely unanswered. In Metrica's view, a sustained failure to respond to a substantial shareholder through a listed company's own investor-relations channel is itself a corporate-governance concern.
An exceptional and unexplained discount to value
At the centre of Metrica's letter is WUS's persistent discount to net asset value of approximately 80%. The discount is most clearly illustrated by a single holding: WUS owns, through its offshore subsidiary chain, an economic interest of approximately 11.3% in WUS Printed Circuit (Kunshan) Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen: 002463), a listed company that has historically been the principal source of WUS's earnings. On the basis of publicly available market data, Metrica notes that the market value of that single stake is worth several multiples of WUS's entire market capitalisation — implying that the market currently ascribes negative value to everything else WUS owns, including its operating printed-circuit-board business, its cash and securities, and its real estate.
"A well-governed company does not allow its shares to trade at a fraction of the value of a single listed asset on its balance sheet, year after year, without explanation," said Damian L. Edwards, Chief Investment Officer of Metrica Partners. "We have approached WUS privately, constructively, and repeatedly. The Company's silence is precisely why we are now writing in the open. Shareholders are entitled to answers, and they are entitled to them before the annual meeting."
The concerns raised in the letter
In its letter, Metrica asks the Board to address, among other things:
- Capital allocation. WUS has maintained a notably low dividend payout — approximately 11.6% of earnings for the 2024 financial year, and on the order of 15% for 2025 — while declining to return capital through buybacks despite the steep discount to asset value. Metrica asks the Board to set out a clear capital-allocation framework and a concrete plan to address the value gap.
- The Kunshan stake and its proposed H-share listing. Following the September 2025 announcement that the Kunshan company is planning a Hong Kong (H-share) listing, Metrica seeks clarity on how this affects WUS's look-through value and, critically, whether and how WUS's minority shareholders — rather than only the controlling shareholders — will share in that value.
- Governance, control and related-party dealings. Metrica asks the Board to demonstrate that the Company is being managed for the benefit of all shareholders, and to account for the controls governing related-party transactions within the WUS group.
- Investor communications. Metrica calls on WUS to materially improve the frequency, responsiveness and accessibility — including in English — of its engagement with shareholders.
Metrica has requested a call with senior management, and ideally an independent director, within ten business days and in any event before the Company's Annual General Meeting on 12 June 2026.
Reservation of rights
While Metrica's strong preference is constructive dialogue, the letter notes that minority shareholders of a Taiwanese listed company have a range of avenues available to them, including raising matters at the annual meeting, the protections afforded under the Securities Investors and Futures Traders Protection Act and the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center, and the rights conferred on qualifying shareholders under the Company Act. Metrica has indicated it is prepared to coordinate with other minority and institutional shareholders as appropriate.
The full text of the open letter is available at http://metricapartners.com, and at the bottom of this press release.
About Metrica Partners Pte. Ltd. Metrica Partners is a Singapore-based investment firm founded in 2016 focused on investing in Asia-Pacific listed equities.
Disclaimer This press release is provided for informational purposes only and reflects the opinions of Metrica Partners Pte. Ltd. based on publicly available information believed to be reliable as of the date hereof. It does not constitute investment, legal, accounting or tax advice, nor an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security. Metrica and its affiliates hold a position in the shares of WUS Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. and may buy or sell securities of the Company at any time without further notice. Statements regarding asset values and discounts are estimates based on public data and prevailing market prices, which fluctuate. Metrica undertakes no obligation to update this release.
Metrica Partners Pte. Ltd.
1 Raffles Place
#10-63 One Raffles Place Tower 2
Singapore 048616
10 June 2026
BY EMAIL (investor@wuspc.com) AND REGISTERED POST
The Board of Directors c/o Ms. Mandy Lu, Spokesperson (and Mr. Chinan Chen, Acting Spokesperson), WUS Printed Circuit Co., Ltd., No. 37 Kai Fa Road, Nanzih District, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Re: Demand for engagement on persistent NAV discount, capital allocation, and the Company's investor-communication obligations
Dear Members of the Board,
We write as the manager of investment funds that are the beneficial holders of approximately 1.5% of the issued share capital of WUS Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. (the "Company"), a holding we have built and intend to maintain. We are long-term shareholders writing in good faith, but with considerable and growing concern.
Over the past several weeks we have repeatedly contacted the Company's designated investor-contact window — by email to investor@wuspc.com and by telephone to +886-7-3612116 — to request a discussion of the Company's business conditions and capital-allocation policy. We have received no response of any kind. For a TWSE-listed issuer, a sustained failure to respond to a substantial shareholder through its own published investor-relations channel is not a minor administrative lapse; it is itself a corporate-governance failing, and it sits awkwardly against the Company's obligations as a listed issuer (addressed below). This letter is a formal escalation.
The core problem: a near-permanent, extreme discount to intrinsic value
The Company's shares trade at a discount to net asset value of roughly 80% — an exceptional figure that demands an explanation the Company has so far never given.
The discount is most starkly illustrated by a single asset. According to our understanding, the Company holds, through its offshore subsidiary chain (including its BVI and Hong Kong intermediate holding entities), an approximately 11.3% economic interest in WUS Printed Circuit (Kunshan) Co., Ltd., which historically has been the principal source of the Company's earnings via dividend recognition. As of 8 June 2026, the Kunshan company carries a market capitalisation on the order of CNY 260+ billion (roughly NT$1.2 trillion). An 11.3% interest therefore has an indicative market value well in excess of NT$130 billion — several multiples of WUS's own total market capitalisation of roughly NT$30 billion.
Put plainly: the market value of the Company's listed Kunshan stake alone appears to be worth more than four times the entire market value of WUS itself. That implies the market currently ascribes a value of less than zero to everything else the Company owns: its operating PCB business, its cash and securities, and its real estate. No coherent explanation for this has been offered to shareholders.
This is exactly the situation Taiwan's regulators have begun to target directly. The Taiwan Stock Exchange announced in 2024 an "Enterprise Value Enhancement Plan" to be incorporated into the Corporate Governance Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies, guiding companies to disclose shareholder-value information and key indicators, with the price-to-net-asset-value ratio explicitly built into market-making reward measures — Taiwan's counterpart to the "value-up" reforms in Japan and Korea. A company trading at ~0.2x look-through NAV is the archetypal case these reforms are meant to address.
Specific concerns we expect the Company to address
- Capital-allocation framework and the NAV discount. The Company's dividend policy has been strikingly ungenerous relative to its earnings power. For FY2024 the payout ratio was approximately 11.6% (a proposed cash dividend of just NT$0.5 per share), and for FY2025, despite reported EPS of NT$13.38, the Board proposed a dividend of only NT$2 — a payout of only 15%. The stated rationale has been to "retain ammunition for investment." Shareholders are entitled to ask: what is the framework? Where is the retained capital being deployed, at what return, and why has none of it been returned through buybacks while the stock trades at a fraction of asset value? A persistent 80% discount is not consistent with a board that is actively managing the value gap.
- The Kunshan stake and the announced H-share listing. On 19 September 2025, the Kunshan company announced it was planning an H-share (Hong Kong) listing. We require clarity on how this affects WUS's look-through interest, whether any dilution or restructuring is contemplated, and crucially whether and how the minority shareholders of WUS — as opposed to the controlling family — will participate in the value of this asset. The Company should also explain why it has never pursued options to crystallise this value for all shareholders (e.g., distribution-in-specie, partial monetisation, or a return of the resulting proceeds).
- Related-party transactions and alignment. The Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies (Article 17) require that financial and business dealings between a listed company, its related parties and its shareholders be conducted on a fair, reasonable, arm's-length basis, with non-arm's-length transactions and improper channelling of interests prohibited, and that material related-party transactions be approved by the board and reported to shareholders. Given the dense web of cross-holdings and intercompany relationships within the WUS group, we expect a clear account of all material related-party arrangements and the controls that ensure minority shareholders are not disadvantaged relative to the controlling shareholders.
- Governance, control and succession. Following the death of the group's founder in April 2024, shareholders need transparency on the control structure, the role and independence of the board, and succession. The Best-Practice Principles open (Article 2) with the duty to protect the rights and interests of shareholders, and require (Article 21) fair and open director-election procedures that encourage shareholder participation. We are concerned that the Company is being operated primarily in the interests of its controlling shareholders rather than the shareholder body as a whole, and we expect the Board to demonstrate, with specifics, that this is not the case.
- Investor communications. The Company appears to hold only a single investor briefing per year (most recently an online session in December 2025 hosted by a brokerage), provides limited English-language disclosure to its foreign shareholders, and — as our own experience demonstrates — does not reliably respond through its published investor-contact window. This falls short of the engagement standards the TWSE now actively promotes, including under the Stewardship Code and its encouragement of issuer–investor dialogue.
What we are requesting
We request that the Company arrange, within ten (10) business days of this letter and in any event before the 12 June 2026 Annual General Meeting, a call or meeting with senior management — and, given the subject matter, ideally an independent director — to discuss:
- the Company's current business conditions and outlook;
- its capital-allocation framework, dividend policy, and the rationale for retaining capital rather than returning it;
- its stated policy (if any) for addressing the ~80% discount to NAV, including any "value enhancement" plan responsive to the TWSE initiative;
- the treatment of the 11.3% Kunshan interest, the implications of the proposed H-share listing, and how minority shareholders will share in that value;
- material related-party transactions and the safeguards protecting minority shareholders; and
- the Company's plan to improve the frequency, responsiveness and accessibility (including English-language) of its investor communications.
Reservation of rights
We would much prefer a constructive dialogue, and we write in that spirit. However, we want to be clear that we are aware of the avenues available to shareholders of a Taiwanese listed company. These include submitting shareholder proposals and raising these matters directly at the AGM; the protections of the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act and the dispute-mediation and litigation functions of the Securities and Futures Investors Protection Center; and the rights afforded to qualifying shareholders under the Company Act — including, for holders above the relevant thresholds, the ability to submit formal proposals, to apply to the court for the appointment of an inspector to examine the Company's books and affairs, and to pursue directors for breaches of their duties. As a manager of funds holding approximately 1.5% of the Company, we exceed the 1% threshold relevant to several of these rights, and we are prepared to coordinate with other minority and institutional shareholders as appropriate.
We sincerely hope none of that proves necessary. The simplest path is for the Company to do what a well-governed listed issuer should do as a matter of course: respond to its shareholders and explain itself.
Please confirm receipt of this letter and propose a time for the requested call by return.
Yours sincerely,
Damian L. Edwards
Chief Investment Officer
Metrica Partners Pte. Ltd.
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